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ARTICLES
PUBLIC LANDS MANAGEMENT IN AN AGE OF
DEREGULATION AND PRIVATIZATION
James L. Huffman'
I.

INTRODUCTION

What to do with the millions of acres of land owned by the United
States government? It is a perennial question. Should we raise or lower the
allowable timber harvest? Should we designate more lands as wilderness
areas? Should we manage lands for their value as wildlife habitat at the
expense of resource development?
At the surface, these questions reflect the competing preferences of
the individuals who will experience the benefits provided by public lands.
All the participants in this political struggle for the scarce resources of the
public lands will each claim that the public interest is served by the
allocation they urge. They will even come to believe that their view of the
public interest is the correct one, and that the political opposition is
probably acting out of self interest.
Few individuals or interest groups are so bold or politically naive as to
claim that they simply have a better understanding of the public interest.
Thus they rely on the process of public lands decision making as the
assurance that the public interest is being served. If the decision is reached
in the right way, it will be the right decision, and the fact that it happens to
coincide with the personal preferences of some is just their good fortune.
Processes influence outcomes. But our debates over public lands management processes have seldom ranged beyond alternative forms of public
management. There is a presumption in favor of public, as opposed to
private management. This presumption predisposes us to make particular
allocations of our public lands resources.
Some will insist that we have explored the public and private
alternatives and have settled upon public management as appropriate to
1. Professor of Law and Director, Natural Resources Law Institute, Lewis and Clark Law
School. B.S. 1967 Montana State University; M.A. 1969, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy; J.D.
1972, University of Chicago. The author is grateful to John Baden for helpful comments and
suggestions. A version of this paper was delivered at the 11 th Annual Public Land Law Conference,
April 29, 1989. "
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the resources on the public lands. Having committed these lands to public
control, the issue for many is simply one of economics, or science in the
"hard science" sense of things like entomology, silviculture and geology.
For others it is all politics, or perhaps land use planning which is somehow
supposed to purify the political process when allocating scarce resources.
But the reality is that public management only limits and controls the ways
in which private or "special" interests may influence public lands resource
allocation. The private alternatives merit consideration regardless of our
social objectives.
Our objective in public lands management should be to maximize the
net benefits experienced by the members of our society while assuring
fairness in the distribution of the costs and benefits of that management.2
These are social goals borne of personal values. Some will prescribe
different goals. Others will agree with my objectives but will disagree about
the manner and measure of their realization. These are hard questions
about which reasonable people can differ. Unfortunately reasonable people
do not always resort to reason in settling their differences.
When people are faced with these hard questions they normally look
for a shortcut; for some way to make a difficult problem simple. When
faced with the reality of fundamental disagreement over questions of value,
people tend to resort to debate over questions of minutia. The shortcut
becomes a seemingly endless journey of procedural intricacy and factual
trivia.
The evidence of hard question avoidance is everywhere: in legislative
debates, agency hearings, environmental impact statements, and in the
opinions of our courts. We are not very good at addressing what really
2. These objectives can be stated alternatively as allocational efficiency and distributional
fairness. See infra note 19 for an explanation of the difference between the concepts of allocation and
distribution.
It is often argued that although allocational efficiency and distributional fairness are legitimate
and important goals, there are other goals of equal importance, like aesthetic values, species survival,
and the needs of future generations. But these values are encompassed in the objective of allocational
efficiency. There is nothing about the concept of efficient allocation which precludes all manner of
human values from entering into the calculus of maximized net social welfare. Market mechanisms
may bias results in a particular direction, but that is a failure of the market, not evidence that certain
values are not accounted for in the pursuit of allocational efficiency. People can and do place
measurable value on aesthetic pleasures or upon the survival of species. The efficiency interests of
future generations are accounted for as well as they can be by the discounting mechanisms of the
market. Nonmarket allocational mechanisms will not avoid the need to discount future interests
relative to current interests. The distributional interests of future generations can only be weighed in
the balance with the distributional interests of current generations.
The only interests which are precluded from the objectives of allocational efficiency and
distributional fairness are those which do not attach to people. If spotted owls or old growth trees have
interests of their own, they are not included in my objectives for public lands management. This is not
because I am unwilling to conceive that such interests might exist, but rather because 1,like all other
humans, am unable to conceive of these interests independent from my own interests. See infra note 19.
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matters to us. We prefer to win our point by circumvention and obfuscation, by focusing on the trees rather than the forest. Our obsession with the
mechanics of process-with notice and hearings and comments and
findings of fact-facilitates, even requires, evasion of the important
questions. If we hope to manage public lands resources efficiently and
fairly, we need to pay more attention to the philosophy of process, which
means we must seriously address the fundamental choice between public
and private control.
A.

The Spotted Owl Controversy

Illustrative of our approach to public lands management is the
currently heated public lands issue in the Pacific Northwest - the spotted
owl. The spotted owl seems to prefer old trees to young trees. Would they, if
forced, be willing to live in a new forest of young trees? The issue is being
hotly debated. But even if it turns out that spotted owls would do just fine in
a thirty or sixty year old stand of Douglas Fir, the forest management
controversy in the Northwest will not go away. Radical environmentalists
will continue to chain themselves to trees and construct themselves into
stone roadblocks even if it turns out that the spotted owl does not really
need old growth timber.
The controversy will not go away because the spotted owl is not really
the issue. For a few "birders" it may be the issue, but most people have
never seen a spotted owl and would not miss them if they all moved to
California. The real issue is how should we decide whether the benefits of
spotted owl habitat preservation justify the costs? The environmentalists
argue that the owl is an "indicator species," which means that if it cannot
survive, there are many other species which cannot survive, which means
that an ecotone or perhaps an entire ecosystem will have been destroyed.
The environmentalist assumes that this is bad and that the case for
protecting the spotted owl is thus made. Congress seems to have reached
the same conclusion in the Endangered Species Act, but the difficult task of
resource allocation will never be satisfactorily accomplished by resort to
such absolutes.
On the other side of the debate in the Pacific Northwest are jobs in the
timber industry. The old growth forests which spotted owls inhabit are an
important source of timber for the mills which employ thousands of people
in Oregon and Washington. Not only are old growth trees unproductive
from a silvicultural point of view, but their preservation will keep some of
the best timber lands out of production permanently. If the spotted owl
stays, some existing jobs in the timber industry will be lost. No one really
debates that conclusion, although the environmentalists question the
industry's claim that fifty percent of the Oregon and Washington mills will
be closed by January if old growth cutting is forbidden. But will it
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permanently cripple the economy of the Pacific Northwest? No. History
demonstrates the capacity of the Northwest economy to adapt to the
declining importance of timber. Will the timber workers drop their
opposition to old growth forest preservation if it turns out that the
Northwest economy will in fact gain from such action? Probably not. Like
the environmentalists, the proponents of old growth harvesting have more
to their agenda than meets the eye.
Either some timber workers or some spotted owls will face hard times
depending upon who prevails in the current debate, but neither the owls nor
the jobs are the central issue. Both are symbols in a debate we need to have,
but have been avoiding for decades. The fundamental question is not what
we should do with the public lands, but how we should go about deciding
what to do. Environmentalists and timber industry adversaries in Oregon's
old growth forests will probably disagree with this formulation of the
fundamental question. After all, what they care about is the fate of the old
growth forests. But the reality is that what we do with those forests depends
significantly on how we decide what to do. The social institutions of
resource allocation are not neutral. Even if we set a common goal-the
public interest is usually a leading candidate-different allocational
institutions will allocate scarce resources differently.
We all have more or less strongly held opinions about whether a
particular forest should be logged or preserved as wilderness, or whether a
particular waterway should be dammed or protected for white water
rafting. There will always be disagreements. The question is how to decide
among the various points of view, all of which have a legitimate claim to
being heard when the lands are publicly owned. Should we simply vote and
count everyone's vote the same? Should we weight the votes on the basis of
people's stakes in the decision? Should we rely on expert resource
managers to determine the "best" uses of our natural resources? Or should
we manage these resources the way we manage most other resources in the
American economy-through regulated private rights and market forces?
The choice among these alternative allocation institutions will have more
to do with the future of our public lands than will competing perceptions of
the public interest.
Spotted owls and timber industry jobs are symbols in a hidden or
obscured controversy over public versus private management of natural
resource lands. Although the very concept of public lands would seem to
suggest that this controversy has been resolved in favor of public management, at least with respect to the resource lands in federal ownership, the
issue is not so simple. As many public land laws evidence, public ownership
of resource lands does not necessarily commit us to public management of
the resources on those lands. Nor does private ownership commit us to
private management as evidenced by the complex of land and resource use
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regulatory schemes which apply to privately owned properties. The
important factor is who makes management decisions, not who has title.
The private lessee of public resources is the decision maker within the
terms of the lease. The public regulator of private resources is the decision
maker to the extent of the regulatory authority.
B.

Deciding How to Decide

There are persuasive arguments to be made for both public and
private management. Depending upon our objectives in allocating resources, these arguments will lead us to choose public management in some
cases and private management in others. The reason we need to examine
the public and private alternatives is that existing public ownership and
control is largely a consequence of historical circumstance, not of rational
application of the arguments for public management. The same can be said
of much existing regulatory authority, although government regulation
has received more reasoned analysis than public ownership.
Some will suggest that this debate has long since been settled. But the
reality is that the debate over rational management of scarce natural
resources has never really taken place. It is true that the Public Land Law
Review Commission considered the question of federal ownership of vast
western lands and concluded that retention, rather than disposition, should
be the guiding principle for the future.3 It is also true that Congress
approved this principle in the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of
1976.1 And it is true that a few within the early Reagan administration
urged a policy of privatization. There were, however, relatively few
transfers of land to the private sector, perhaps fewer acres sold than were
added during the same period of time.6 But Tederal retention of public
lands, although it certainly facilitates public control, does not preclude
effective private management of resources located on federally owned
lands. The issue of public versus private management is not resolved by the
retention of title in the federal government. The important question is not
who has title, but rather how and by whom resource allocation decisions are
made. To a significant degree, what should have been a debate over public
3. PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW COMMISSION, ONE THIRD OF THE NATION'S LAND 9 (1970). The
Commission recommended that lands should be disposed of only if it was the only way to maximize the
net public benefit.
4. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-82 (1982). "The Congress declares that it is the policy of the United States
that the public lands be retained in Federal ownership, unless as a result of the land use planning
procedure provided for in this Act, it is determined that disposition of a particular parcel will serve the
national interest." 43 U.S.C. § 1701(a)(l).
5. For a Discussion on Reagan administration policy and the "sagebrush rebellion," see Babbitt,
Federalism and the Environment: An Intergovernmental Perspective on the Sagebrush Rebellion, 12
ENVTL. L. 847 (1982).
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versus private management has been obscured by arguments over who
should have title.
To the extent that the issues of title and public versus private control
have been addressed, they have been engaged largely at a political level. At
that level public control and ownership are the inevitable results since the
question is not how best to allocate resources but who will control and
benefit from particular allocations. The proponents of private management
are typically those not in control of publicly owned resources. If and when
they gain political control, their interest in privatization quickly dissipates.' This political reality makes it unlikely that the debate will ever
transcend academic discussions like this one, 7 but the effort is not
necessarily quixotic. Principle has occasionally, but importantly, prevailed
over politics in the American system of government.
To achieve the objectives of maximized net benefits and fair distribution of those benefits, we must address the alternatives of public and private
management in isolation from particular resource use questions. This essay
will not attempt to prescribe the appropriate mix of public and private
management. Rather it explains why we have not successfully addressed
this difficult question in the past and suggests that now is an opportune time
to do so. Part II examines the history of public land law through the middle
of the 20th century to reveal the dominant role of special interests in the
making of public land policy. Part III demonstrates how private interests
have continued to govern public lands policy during the succeeding two
decades of "public interest" legislation. Part IV concludes by suggesting
that the deregulation and privatization themes of the current decade
provide an opportunity to carefully and rationally reassess our approach to
managing the resources of the public lands.
II.

PUBLIC LANDS HISTORY AS MYTH AND REALITY

Public lands history is well documented. Gates," Hibbard,9 and
Peffer' n have all provided excellent, detailed accounts of the history of
America's public lands. But in a society with little patience for understand6. The Reagan administration came into office with plans for privatization of much of the public
land resources, but with time and the passing of Secretary of Interior James Watt, the Reagan
appointees seemed to become less interested in disposal and more interested in management of the
public lands.
7. The question has remained on the agenda of many political conservatives outside of academia.
For a contemporary prescription for privatization, as modified by political realism, see THE HERITAGE
FOUNDATION, MANDATE FOR LEADERSHIP II1: POLICY STRATEGIES FORTHE 1990s, at 148-150, 311316 (1989). Included in the section on the Department of Interior is a specific proposal for
decentralization in the control of wilderness and park lands.
8. P. GATES, HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT (1968).
9. B. HIBBARD, A HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND POLICIES (1924).
10. L. PEFFER, THE CLOSING OF TIlE PUBLIC DOMAIN (1951).
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ing the complexities of history, we tend to rely on brief, thematic accounts
of our past. There are at least two such accounts of the history of the public
lands, each with a constituency which stands to benefit from acceptance of
its version of history. Such uses and abuses of history are a staple of
American politics, especially evident in the politics of the public lands.
According to the account favored by environmentalists and much of
the general public, the public lands of the United States were exploited and
abused by big business until the federal government intervened in the late
19th century to protect those lands and the resources they contain. The
government provided this protection for several decades, particularly
through the Forest Service and the National Park Service, but by the 1960s
the government's land managers had been led astray or captured by
politically influential private interests. This required both Congressional
and judicial action to assure that the public lands continued to serve their
public purposes. This account is largely mythology, or at least a gross oversimplification.
For every bit of politically useful mythology there will be an opposing
myth, which in the case of public lands history is the view commonly
espoused by the traditional developers of public land resources and often by
the western states. According to this view the federal government's public
lands policies have been, for well over a century, an obstacle to economic
growth and prosperity. Beginning with early restraints on private acquisition of public lands,11 followed by the locking up of millions of acres of those
lands under pressure from conservationists,'" followed in turn by the recent
adoption of a complex of statutes and regulations at the behest of
environmentalists,' 3 the industries and communities of the West have been
denied the use of the vast resources of the public lands.
Thematic accounts of history are not the exclusive tool of politics,
however. If we are unwilling to take the time to understand history, those
who do may rescue us from our ignorance by providing us with thematic, if
generalized, accounts of our past. One such account of public lands history
is that offered by Professors Coggins and Wilkinson in their public lands
coursebook for law students.' 4 According to Coggins and Wilkinson,
public land law, which presumably has had a dominant influence on public
lands history, was largely concerned with questions of private rights in
public land resources until the mid 1960s. At that time 'a dramatic
philosophical shift made the public interest, rather than private rights, the
focus of public land law. "During the last generation," they conclude, "the
1I.See
12.
13.
14.

infra text accompanying notes 41-48.
See infra text accompanying notes 50-66.
See infra text accompanying notes 78-87.
G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, FEDERAL PUBLIC LAND AND RESOURCES LAW (2d ed. 1987).
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central place of private rights, private disputes, and private law . . . has
been superceded by overriding public considerations. . . .There is [now]
an elusive unity . . . which for want of a more definitive phrase can be
called the public interest in the public resources."' 5 Wilkinson has argued
elsewhere that this philosophical shift has changed the federal government
from a land and resource manager to a steward or trustee of the public
lands. 6
This account of our public lands history seems plausible in light of the
rush of public lands legislation which Congress has adopted over the last
quarter century. It is legislation which speaks the language of public
interest both in the objectives and the processes of public lands management. But the plausibility of the Coggins and Wilkinson version of public
lands history is rooted in a particular conception of the public interest. It is
rooted in that conception of the public interest which warrants the Sierra
Club, but not the Pacific Legal Foundation, in calling itself a public
interest advocate. Although Coggins and Wilkinson studiously avoid
denying the public interest title to the Pacific Legal Foundation,"7 their
account of public lands history reveals an assumption that the interests
represented by the PLF and similar organizations are the stuff of past
(private interest), not modern (public interest) public lands law.
This makes the Coggins and Wilkinson account of public lands history
suspect. There is no reason to assume that the Congress and the federal
bureaucracy of the last quarter century have been more motivated to serve
the public interest than were the Congresses and bureaucracies of earlier
generations. Nor is there any reason to assume that today's public interest
lobbyists are any closer to the true public interest than their predecessors.
Rather than concluding that public interests have replaced private
interests as the driving force in public lands management, we might better
conclude one of two things. Either public lands history has been marked by
changing notions of the public interest, or it has been marked by the
changing political influences of competing interest groups. These may or
may not be two different things, depending upon whether we assume that
the public interest is simply an aggregation of private interests or
something independent from private interests.
Our understanding of public lands history would benefit from an
account which avoids the assertion of a single "public interest." The

15. Id. at 3.
16. Wilkinson, The Public Trust Doctrine in Public Land Laws, 14 U.C. DAVIS L. RE'. 269
(1980).
17. "'Beginning with the Pacific Legal Foundation, industries and individuals have financed
their own versions of public interest law firms to present the corporate view of the public interest in
resource litigation." G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 14. at 7.
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concept of the public interest is most often the tool of private interests in the
competition for scarce resources. The Sierra Club and its members claim
that the public interest requires the preservation of more wilderness and
wildlife habitat. The Pacific Legal Foundation claims that the public
interest requires the development of public land resources. Is it just
coincidence that these conceptions of the public interest conform to the
interests of the individuals who make up these organizations? To label
one's preferences as one's own is to give them no more weight than the
preferences of others. To label one's preferences as the public interest is to
conclude the debate over what should be done with the public lands.18
The ultimate issue in the allocation of scarce resources is this: Which
sets of individuals will experience the benefits and costs, and what benefits
and costs will they experience, from the use or non-use of resources? 9 In
the final analysis it is individuals who experience whatever benefits and
costs there are. The individuals may be of some future generation and thus
unable to express their preferences, but they are none-the-less individuals
18. In the culture of modern American politics it is not possible to assert any objective other than
the public interest, except in the narrow realm ofcivil liberties, and even there the ultimatejustification
is that the public interest depends upon the protection of civil liberties. Thus when an advocate for a
particular action asserts that it is in the public interest, opponents can only respond by claiming that
some other action will better serve the public interest. Public interest is the high ground of American
politics; private interest, notwithstanding an historical concern for individual liberty, is the concern of
the self-indulgent.
19. This statement does not reflect a failure to recognize the economists' distinction between
allocation and distribution. My contention is that individuals care about resource allocation only
because it impacts upon distribution. Thus allocation is important, but only because we care about
distribution.
The distinction between distribution and allocation used in this paper is the following: Distribution
has to do with who bears the costs and benefits of resource uses. Allocation has to do with what costs and
benefits will be produced by resource uses.
Social policy may be concerned with either or both. Our social objective (without addressing the
difficult question of how social objectives are determined) may seek to allocate resources so that net
social wealth is maximized, or it may seek to distribute costs and benefits equally to all members of
society. More probably, the social goal will be some mix of allocational and distributional results.
Although one might adopt the purely utilitarian position that social wealth maximization should guide
all social policy, distributional questions cannot be ignored since the efficient allocation of resources will
be different for every distributional circumstance. Similarly one cannot be exclusively concerned about
wealth distribution since the wealth available for distribution is dependent upon the allocation of
resources, a point implicit in the trickle down theory of Reaganomics.
From the point of view of an individual, allocations of resources are important because of their
distributional consequences. The implication of this statement is that people are self-interested, and
some will deny that their interest in natural resources relates to the benefits and costs which they
personally experience. It may be argued that altruism leads to a concern for the welfare of others, but
even accepting that altruism is not rooted in self-interest, it is nonetheless a distributional concern.
Even those environmentalists who claim only to be concerned for the environment, without regard even
to future generations, are expressing a distributional concern. The only difference is that they have
expanded the relevant universe of individuals to include the trees and the spotted owls. See Stone, Do
Trees Have Standing? 45 S. CAL. L. REV. 450 (1972). For a critique of the Stone thesis, see Huffman,
Trees as a Minority, 5 ENVTL. L. 199 (1974).
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whose interests can only be imagined and represented by living individuals.
The public has no interests independent from the interests of individuals. The public has no capacity to enjoy benefits and suffer costs. Thus the
public interest can never be greater or distinct from some aggregation of
individual interests.20 That is why the way we make resource allocation
decisions is so important. Our resource allocation institutions determine
how individual interests are to be aggregated. We should therefore design
those institutions to achieve an acceptable aggregation.
What is an acceptable aggregation of individual costs and benefits?
Of course individuals will have different views on that question depending
upon their place in the aggregate. Does this mean that the selection among
resource allocation institutions can be no more objective than the selection
among possible allocations of particular resources? The challenge is to
somehow isolate the debate over allocational institutions from debates over
particular allocations. We have theories about how to achieve such
objectivity in the design of social institutions, 2' and we have evidence in the
United States Constitution that it can be achieved.2 2 In any event we must
aspire to its achievement or be forced to abandon our discussions to an
inevitable scramble for the scarce resources of our planet.
But asserting that there is no such thing as the public interest is not
likely to persuade many who have devoted their careers to public lands
management. The concept of the public interest is ingrained in the culture
of public lands ownership and management. Thus, I will suggest a thematic
account of public lands history which accommodates the concept of the
public interest.
From the beginning of our national history, lands in public ownership
have been viewed as important to the future of American society and
nationhood. For most of a century it was widely accepted that the public
interest would be best served by disposing of publicly owned lands.
Virtually every politically influential interest group in early 19th century
American society stood to gain from federal land disposals.
The earliest battles over publicly owned lands were disputes over

20. For contrasting views, see V. HELD, THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND INDIVIDUAL INTERESTS
(1970) and R. NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE AND UTOPIA (1974).
21. See J. RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971).
22. Perhaps the most remarkable thing about the United States Constitution is its articulation of
general principles free, for the most part, of specific requirements of application. The history of
constitution making in this country and elsewhere evidences the difficulty of separating principle from
interest. Perhaps the homogeneity of colonial America led the framers of the Constitution to believe
that principles would be interpreted to assure particular results, or perhaps the fortuity of
circumstances provided them a window of objectivity seldom experienced in politics. Whatever the
explanation for its content, it has proven to be a rare document in its ability to serve the interests of
diverse segments of the population. Of course this is not to say that the Constitution is a neutral or value
free document. It is value laden, but central among the values is equality among social participants.
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political jurisdiction among states and between the states and the new
national government,2" rather than contests over authority to allocate the
resources of those lands. After the federal government emerged with the
lion's share of disputed lands and acquired other lands by conquest and
purchase,2 4 new states were gradually created on those lands.2 5 The federal
government undertook to grant increasingly greater amounts of land to the
new states, while making concessions to the old states, for the purposes of
supporting schools and internal improvements. But the idea was never that
the federal government or the states would retain these lands in public
ownership.
Beginning with the Land Ordinance of 1785,26 the clear intent was to
divide these lands into parcels for disposal to private parties. The federal
and state governments were to benefit from the proceeds of land sales.
More importantly, they were to benefit from the economic development
which was to result from the wise disposition of these lands into private
hands. The national government did resist the unauthorized settlement of
the public lands,2" but in the interest of controlled and profitable disposition, not in the interest of public retention of those lands.
In 1830 Congress passed the first general preemption law allowing
squatters on public lands to acquire private rights,2 an act which was
renewed four times prior to the adoption of the Preemption Act of 1841.29
That law was amended periodically until repealed fifty years later by the

23. After the Revolution and before the ratification of the Constitution, the original states and
the new national government came to agreements on the extensive western lands to which various states
had laid claim. Most of these lands came into federal ownership as part of the compromise necessary to
the adoption of the Constitution by the states.
24. The Northwest Territories were ceded to the United States by the original states at the time
of the Constitution. What is now Tennessee was ceded by North Carolina in 1790. What is now
Mississippi and Alabama was ceded by Georgia in 1802. The Louisiana Purchase was acquired from
France in 1803. Florida, the southwest corner of what is now Louisiana and a bit of central Colorado
were ceded by Treaty with Spain in 1819. Texas was annexed in 1845. The Oregon Territory
(Washington, Oregon, Idaho and parts of Montana and Wyoming) was recognized as United States
territory by treaty with Great Britain in 1846. MostoftheSouthwest including California was ceded by
Mexico in 1848. Parts of what are now New Mexico, Colorado, Wyoming, Nebraska and Oklahoma
were purchased from Texas in 1850. The Gadsden Purchase (the southern extremities of Arizona and
New Mexico) was acquired from Mexico in 1853. Alaska was purchased from Russia in 1867. Hawaii
was annexed in 1898.
25. See U.S. CoNsT. art. IV, § 3, cl. 1. This provision gives Congress the authority to admit new
states.
26. Ordinance of May 20, 1785, 28 J. CONTINENTAL CONGRmS 375 (Fitpatrick ed. 1933).
27. See, e.g., Act of March 3, 1807, ch. 46, 2 Stat. 445; amendedby Act of March 2, 1833, ch. 95,
4 Stat. 665.
28. Act of May 29,1830, ch. 208,4Stat. 420, repealedbyAct of March 3,1891, ch. 561,26 Stat.
1095.
29. Act of July 14, 1832, ch. 246,4 Stat. 603; Act of June 14, 1834, ch. 54,4 Stat. 678; Act of
June 22, 1838, ch. 119, 5 Stat. 251; Act of June 1, 1840, ch. 32, 5 Stat. 382; The Preemption Act of
1841, §§ 10-15, ch. 16, 5 Stat. 453, repealed by Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095.
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General Land Revision Act of 1891.30 In the meantime Congress passed
several other laws designed to encourage the private acquisition of public
lands. The Homestead Act,"1 the Desert Land Act,3 2 the mineral location
laws, 3 the Timber Culture Act34 and the Timber and Stone Act35 were all
outgrowths of a consistent policy of land disposal. This policy was
continued into the 20th century by the Kinkaid Homestead Act, 6 the
Forest Homestead Act, 7 the Enlarged Homestead Act, 38 the Three Year
Homestead Act,3 9 and the Stock-Raising Homestead Act of 1916.0
But the Congress was not ideological in its commitment to private
management of natural resource lands. The idea that certain lands could
and should be retained in public ownership also had deep historical roots.
Generally the ostensible or express purpose of these public reservations has
been to assure a particular resource allocation which is considered unlikely
to result from private management of the resource.4 1 For example, trees
suitable for use as ship's masts were reserved from other uses under the
charter of the Massachusetts Bay Colony in 1691.42 The reservation was
presumably motivated by a continuing depletion in the supply of such trees
in the accessible forest lands of the colony. Nearly three centuries later,
Garrett Hardin would explain why this scarce resource was being depleted,
although he would probably have suggested a different solution to the

30. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095 (current version at 43 U.S.C. §§ 893, 1181
(1982)).
31. Act of May 20, 1862, ch. 75, 12 Stat. 392, repealedby Act of October21, 1976. Pub. L. 94579, Title VII, § 702, 90 Stat. 2787.
32. Desert Land Act, ch. 107, 19 Stat. 377 (1877) (codified as amended at 43 U.S.C. §§ 321-339
(1982)).
33. Act of July 26, 1866, ch. 262, 14 Stat. 251 (codified at 30 U.S.C. §§ 43, 46, 51 (1982); 43
U.S.C. § 661 (1982)). Placer-Mining Act of 1870, ch. 235, 16 Stat. 217 (1870) (codified at 30 U.S.C.
§§ 35, 36,38,43,46,47,51,52 (1982); 43 U.S.C. §§ 661,766 (1982)). Mining Act of May 10, 1872, ch.
152, 17 Stat. 91.
34. Ch. 277, 17 Stat. 605 (1873), repealedby Act of March 3, 1891, ch 561, § 1,26 Stat 1095.
35. Ch. 151, 20 Stat. 89 (1878) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1852 (1982)).
36. Kincaid Act (Nebraska Homesteads), ch. 1801, 33 Stat. 547 (1904), repealed by "Act of
October 21, 1976, Pub. L. 94-579, Title VII, § 702, 90 Stat. 2787.
37. Forest Act (Agricultural Entries), ch. 3074, 34 Stat. 233 (1906), repealed by 16 U.S.C. §
506 (1982).
38. Ch. 298, 36 Stat. 531 (1910).
39. Ch. 153, 37Stat. 123 (1912), repealed by Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. 94-579,TitleVll.§
702, 90 Stat. 2787.
40. Ch.9,39 Stat. 862(1916), repealed by Act of21, 1976, Pub. L. 94-579, Title VII, § 702,90
Stat. 2787.
41. In modern economic jargon the problem with private management in these cases is that the
market fails to provide for pricing and exchange of certain goods and services because of high
transactions costs. I f these "public goods" are not provided publicly they will be monopolized or will not
be provided at all.
42. J. ISE, THE UNITED STATES FOREST POLICY 19 (1920).
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problem.4 3 Even before 1691 the King of England had reserved mines and
minerals to the Crown, although the purpose of that reservation, like many

modern reservations, was clearly distributional rather than allocational. 44
It is important to note that although the justification for public control
is generally rooted in the theory of market failure,45 the problem in the case
of the depleted timber for ship masts was the existence of a commons and
therefore the lack of property rights which enable a market to function with
allocational efficiency. Market failure and the lack of a market are two
different problems. The public goods of modern economic theory are not
necessarily the commons of American history.
The preferred solution to the tragedy of the commons is the creation of
property rights with resultant markets, not the substitution of one type of
commons for another. Although there are resources for which some form of
commons is unavoidable due to the nature of the resource and the limits of

our thinking on private rights, it is a serious mistake to assume that
government control is always, or even often, the best solution to the tragedy

of the commons. Frequently government control simply substitutes one
tragedy for another.
From the beginning of the 19th century Congress occasionally

undertook to reserve lands or resources for particular purposes. One early
concern was for a continued supply of oak for the ship building industry.4"
Were these reservations in the public interest? Perhaps. Were they in the
interest of the ship building industry? Certainly. The same questions can
be asked about most of the subsequent reservations of public lands.
43. Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968). The solution to the
tragedy of the commons is the substitution of private property for the commons, thus assuring that the
person or persons who benefit from the use of a resource also bear the costs of that use. Theoretically this
elimination of external costs may be accomplished by public ownership, but the reality is that public
ownership merely substitutes the resource depleting scramble of politics for the exploitation of the
commons. See infra, pt. Ill.
In the case of the reservation of trees for masts it may have been that suitable trees were being used
for other, less valuable purposes, and that more efficient allocation of timber was achieved by the
reservation. However, it may have been that the Crown was in competition for such trees with others in
need of masts, and that the reservation thus served to monopolize the supply, perhaps with inefficient
results.
44. On the distinction between allocation and distribution see note 19 infra.
The King no doubt asserted that it was important to the welfare of the state and therefore the
citizenry that title to mines and minerals remain in the Crown. However, it is equally clear that title to
mines and minerals was critical to the wealth of the Crown as a private entity. It is unlikely that one
could demonstrate that minerals were more efficiently allocated as a result of Crown ownership than
they would have been in private ownership. The creation of public reserves for private benefit is not
unique to the King of England. It has generally been the motivation for public reserves under American
public land law as well. See text ace. supra notes 62-65.
45. See supra note 41.
46. J. CAMERON, THE DEVELOPMENT OF GOVERNMENTAL FOREST CONTROL IN THE UNITED
STATES chs. I!, Ill and IV (1972).
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Yellowstone Park was reserved in 1872 in a response to a remarkably
early concern for the preservation of unusual geology and geography.4" In
light of the modern taste for nature and the outdoors, it was a fortunate,
some would say far-sighted, action. Was it in the public interest in 1872?
Perhaps, but it was in many ways an easy decision to make in a seemingly
endless and inexhaustible wilderness. Those wishing to preserve Yellowstone's unique geology could be satisfied without serious impact upon the
interests of other's seeking benefits from the public lands.4"
After the creation of Yellowstone National Park, the most common
argument against disposal of public lands related to a desire for watershed
protection at the headwaters of the Missouri, Columbia and other
navigable rivers.4 9 But it was timber, not water, protection which inspired
the most significant reservations of public lands in American history. What
motivated the exclusion of Pational forest lands from those generally
available for private acquisition?
In 1879 a Public Land Commission was created to inquire into, among
other things, the advisability of retaining or disposing of the public lands."
But that issue did not receive much consideration because any disagreements "were over how to dispose of it," 51 not whether to do so. The
Commission recommended the continued disposal of farm lands, but
suggested that the federal government retain ownership of timber lands
while selling the timber. 2 Although this recommendation was to find
growing support, its rationale is lost upon most modern advocates of
multiple use public lands management. The Commission concluded that
the "most conspicuous characteristic [of western public land] from an
economic point of view is its heterogeneity. One region is exclusively
valuable for mining, another solely for timber, a third for nothing but
pasturage, and a fourth serves no useful purpose whatever.""
In 1891 Congress adopted An Act to Repeal Timber-Culture Laws,
and for Other Purposes, the 24th section of which authorized the President

47. Act of Mar. 1, 1872, ch. 24, 17 Stat. 32 (codified as amended at 16 U.S.C. §§ 21-40(1978)).
48. An illustration of the ease of resource reservation under conditions of abundance was the
Montana Board of Natural Resources and Conservation's actions on the Yellowstone in the late 1970s.
For an indepth study of this proceeding see Huffman, The Allocation of Water to Instream Flows:
Montana Water Resources Management (1980) (available from Natural Resources Law Institute,
Lewis and Clark Law School, Portland, OR).
49. G. PINCHOT, BREAKING NEW GROUND 27 (1947).
50. 9 Cong. Rec. 2339-40 (1879).
51. Huffman, A History of Forest Policy in the United States, 8 ENVTL. L. 239, 255 (1978).
52. For a summary of the Commission's recommendation see P. GATES & R. SWENSON,
HISTORY OF PUBLIC LAND LAW DEVELOPMENT xi-xii (1968).
53.

REPORT OF THE PUBLIC LAND COMMISSION, H.R. EXEC. Doc. No. 46, at 9,46th Cong, 2d

Sess. (1880).
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to create public, forest reservations.54 Because the bill was presented as a
rider to other legislation near the end of a legislative session to a committee
without significant western representation, it was passed with little
debate.55 But the debate was soon to come because President Harrison did
not delay in creating over 13 million acres of forest reserves. 56 Although
President Cleveland sought to avoid political controversy through the
creation of a National Forest Commission which would develop a plan for
national forest management, politics and the end of his term led him to
create 21 millions acres of reserves on a single day in 1897. 51 A battle over
public land reservation ensued.
On the side of public lands retention were conservationists like Gifford
Pinchot who sought to substitute European forestry methods for cut and
run logging.58 In opposition to the forest reservations were most western
communities and politicians who feared that their development would be
retarded by the restriction of access to the public lands.5 9 In the background was the timber industry which may well have perceived that it
would prosper in either case. If the lands were not reserved, the public lands
disposal laws would remain impossible to enforce and the timber companies would continue to make short term profits while lacking any incentive
to invest in the future productivity of the commons.6 0 If the forest lands
were reserved from settlement, the timber companies would no longer have
to compete with other economic interests for the use of these lands.
Consistent with the recommendations of the Public Lands Commission,
forest lands would be zoned for the primary purpose of timber
production. 6
In a sense, the public interest (of aggregated private interests) was
served by this system of forest reservations because most interest groups
got much of what they wanted. Preservationists got more national parks
and numerous primitive and wilderness areas within the boundaries of the
54. Act of March 3, 1891, ch. 561, 26 Stat. 1095.
55. J. IsF, supra note 42, at 117-118.
56. J. CAMERON, supra note 46, at 205.
57. 29 Stat. 893 (1897).
58. G. PINCHOT, supra note 49, at 23.
59. The Montana Legislature adopted a resolution on March 1, 1897 which stated: "We, the
legislative assembly of the State of Montana, do earnestly protest against the recent order of the
President setting aside large timber reservations in this State, knowing that its enforcement would
seriously cripple and retard its development. For these and other reasons, we respectfully request that
this order be at once revoked." 29 Cong. Rec. 2548 (1897).
60. See Huffman, supra note 51, at 249-250.
61. "Although the . . .[forest reservations] had the support of the American Forestry
Association, it was opposed by most western Congressmen as a sell-out to the timber corporations. ...
The. . . [reserves] were also opposed by miners who generally opposed a forest reserve system within
which they could not mine." Id. at 261.
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national forests.62 Miners got access to the forest reserves. 63 Local
communities got guarantees of input on management of the forest
reserves,6 4 and an opportunity to make claims on lands prior to the creation
of many of the reserves.6 5 Conservationists got forests to manage like the
tree farms which Pinchot envisioned. 66 The timber industry got vast areas
of forest land protected from competing uses. The industry also got a
government agency it could call its own over time. And so it was that the
public interest led to the creation of the National Forest system. For the
next half century, the various private interests would remain reasonably
happy with this system for allocating the scarce resources of federally
owned timber lands.
Although forest reservations constitute the bulk of withdrawn public
lands, both in number and total area, lands have also been withdrawn for
other purposes. The National Park System consists of over 77 million
acres, all but 20 million acres of which are in Alaska, withdrawn over the
last century and administered pursuant to the National Park Service
Organic Act of 1916.67 Since 1903 a system of wildlife refuges has
gradually been created and is now administered as the National Wildlife
Refuge System.6 8 These, and an array of other special use areas have been
reserved, many in the last two decades, always in the name of the public
interest. But like the national forests, these reservations were expected to,
and do serve the interests of particular segments of American society. For
every successful assertion of public interest, there is a determined private
interest in the background.
And what of the vast reaches of public lands not included in the special
use reservations? For several decades most of them remained available for
private acquisition under the various land disposal laws. Consistent with
the early land grants designed to promote public works, millions of acres
were given to the railroads. Some of America's greatest personal fortunes
were built on this foundation of public largess in the public interest. On
almost all public lands miners could explore for minerals and acquire title

62. These areas were administratively created by the Forest Service. In almost every case they
encompassed areas with little value for timber production.
63. 27 Cong. Rec. 85, 111, 364 (1894).
64. Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson directed the Chief Forester in 1905 that -[in] the
management of each reserve local questions will be decided upon local grounds." See J. CAMtERON,
supra note 46, at 240.
65. Act of June 4, 1897, ch. 2, § 2, 30 Stat. 34. This act suspended the reserves until March I,
1898 and left the lands open to settlement until that date.
66. "Forestry is Tree Farming," wrote Pinchot in BREAKING NEw GROUND, supra note 49 at
31. Pinchot's book is replete with explanations of his views on managed timber production and his
disagreements with the preservationists. See Huffman, supra note 51, at 251-252.
67. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1-18(f) (1982).
68. 16 U.S.C. §§ 668(dd)-668(ee) (1982).
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to lands they proved to be productive. The Mining Law of 1872 remains the
basis for allocation of the mineral resources of the public lands, 69 "because
mineral development has been seen in every generation as a necessary

requisite to national growth and development." 7 Originally coal and fuel
minerals were treated like other minerals, but they were gradually severed
from the surface estate and reserved to the federal government. These
reserved fuel minerals were allocated pursuant to leasing systems rather

than private title in fee simple, 7' a distinction without a difference if the
tenure of the lease is of economically appropriate duration.
Still, vast areas of public lands remained without express statutory
provision for its management. For the most part these were lands which
nobody wanted, at least not under the terms of the land disposal laws.

These lands were generally useful and used only for grazing. "The reality
of the tragedy of the commons is nowhere more evident," wrote Coggins

and Wilkinson, "than in the history of grazing on the public domain. '"72
Several decades of politics aided by the crisis of the midwest dustbowl of
the mid-1930s led to the adoption of the Taylor Grazing Act,73 which, like
the Mineral Leasing Act, sought to allocate a resource through a
combination of public ownership and private rights of use. These new
grazing reservations, although they were never called that,7 4 were subjected to more government control than were the fuel mineral reservations,

although with little evidence of improved management, 75 and over the
objections of many ranchers who would have preferred permits of a more
economically appropriate duration. 76
The resources of the public lands were thus gradually parcelled out for
ultimately private uses. Not everyone was happy with the allocation, but

69. 30 U.S.C. §§ 22-39 (1982).
70. G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 14, at 146.
71. Mineral Leasing Act, 30 U.S.C. §§ 181, 182, 184, 187(a), 226, 226-1, 226-2, 241 (1982).
72. G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 14, at 153. Notethat Coggins and Wilkinson have
here recognized that the public lands area commons just like the grazing commons about which Hardin
wrote. The solution to the tragedy of the commons on BLM lands was greater government control under
the Taylor Grazing Act (infra note 73), not elimination of the commons.
73. Ch. 865, 48 Stat. 1269 (1934) (current version at 43 U.S.C. §315-315(r) (1982)).
74. "Just as the Forest Reservation Provision of the 1891 legislation had accidentally created the
National Forest System, so too did the Taylor Act create a new federal land system by indirection, now
variously called the 'BLM lands' or the 'national resource lands' of the'public lands' ". G. COGGINS &
C. WILKINSON, supra note 14, at 159.
75. Id.
76. See D. FULTON, FAILURE ON THE PLAINS: A RANCHER'S VIEW OF THE PUBLIc LANDS
PROBLEM (1982). Private grazing rights on public lands are based upon renewable permits of relatively
short duration. It is true that many private ranches effectively had a proprietary interest in these
permits, but the security of that interest was dependent upon political influence, not the terms of the
lease. For a discussion of the history of public grazing lands see G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra
note 14, at 675-681.
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most interests were getting something of what they wanted and always at
some expense to the federal taxpayers. Because the public lands were vast
and the population of the West was relatively small, private interests were
seldom denied at least some time at the public trough. The most vehement
objections continued to come from western politicians still fighting the
battle lost by the original states with the adoption of the constitution. But as
Coggins and Wilkinson have observed,7 7 public lands law and management
experienced a dramatic transition in the 1960s.
III.

THE MODERN ERA: PUBLIC MANAGEMENT IN EARNEST

The modern era in public lands management started with the passage
of the Multiple-Use, Sustained-Yield Act of 1960.78 Congress declared
"that the national forests are established and shall be administered for
outdoor recreation, range, timber, watershed, and wildlife and fish
purposes. ' 79 Multiple use was defined as that "combination that will best
meet the needs of the American people," and "not necessarily the
combination of uses that will give the greatest dollar return or the greatest
unit output." 80 On the face of things the Act did not require significant
changes in Forest Service management practices. Although prior Congressional directives were vague about the purposes of national forests land
management, the Forest Service had been providing all of the specified uses
for decades. But the Act did serve as a reminder to non-timber interests
that the public forest lands were still a commons-that a half century of
proprietary pretense by the timber industry gave it no greater claim on the
national forests than anyone else.
The interest group most threatened by timber oriented management
of the national forests and agricultural oriented management of the BLM
lands were the preservationists who, unlike the conservationists of the
Roosevelt and Pinchot era, sought to preserve some of the public lands as
natural areas unaffected by human civilization. Although the Forest
Service had long maintained wilderness and primitive areas pursuant to
administrative policy, the imprimatur of Congress was sought and realized
in the Wilderness Act of 1964.81 Over the objections of the timber industry,
and only after major concessions to the mining industry, 82 a new interest
group had staked a claim to a significant role in public lands

77. See G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 14.
78. 16 U.S.C. §§ 528-31 (1982).
79. Id. at §528.
80. Id. at §531(a).
81. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1131-36 (1982).
82. The mineral exploration and development laws continued to apply to designated wilderness
areas until the end of 1983. Id. at § 1133(d)(3).
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management."3
Wilderness advocates and other environmentalists rode the momentum of their victory in the Wilderness Act through the rest of the 1960s and
into the 1970s. After decades of settled relationships with the timber
industry and local communities, the Forest Service found itself with a new
constituency, but without an understanding of the new politics of public
lands management. The Renewable Resources Planning Act of 197484 was
designed to facilitate Forest Service planning, but the ink had barely dried
on the President's signature before the clearcutting controversy put the
Forest Service at the forefront of national debate.8 After heated and
extended debate Congress adopted the National Forest Management Act
of 1976 which launched the Forest Service on a planning mission of
previously unimagined proportions.8 In the same session Congress
adopted the Federal Land Policy and Management Act and thus brought
multiple use and planning to the BLM lands which had previously been
little noticed in the controversy over the management of the National
Forests."7
The National Forest Management Act and the Federal Land Policy
and Management Act are models of public interest legislation. Both the
Forest Service and the BLM must develop plans which will assure that they
meet their obligations of multiple use management. Consistent with the
provisions of their agency specific legislation and the Administrative
Procedures Act,"8 both agencies have undertaken elaborate planning
processes which involve every conceivable interest group. The agencies
must, as Coggins and Wilkinson say of the BLM, "tread a sensitive
tightrope in

. .

.regulating public land use."8 9 When they fall off the

tightrope, as they often do, they must then face the disgruntled in court.
Old timers in the Forest Service and the BLM surely did not
comprehend what had hit them. Foresters, range managers, geologists,
hydrologists and other experts in resource management were faced with
making resource allocation decisions with significant distributional im83. The environmentalists and recreationists were a new interest group in the sense that they
could no longer rely on the abundance of public lands to guarantee their preferred uses. With increases
in population, growth in competing uses, and a dramatic increase in demand for non-consumptive uses,
these interests were forced to become involved in public lands politics.
84. 16 U.S.C. at §§1601-13 (1982).
85. The clearcutting issue isdiscussed in CLEARCUTTING: A VIEW FROM THE TOP (E.Horwitz
ed., 1974). See alsoA University View of the ForestService [The Bolle Report], S.Doc. No. 91-115,
9Ist
Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). The issue reached the federal courts in West Virginia Division of the lzaak
Walton League of America, Inc., v. Butz, 522 F.2d 945 (1975).
86. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1600-14 (1982).
87. 43 U.S.C. §§ 1701-84 (1982).
88. Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. §§ 551- (1982).
89. G. COGGINS & C. WILKINSON, supra note 14, at 717.
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pacts on various segments of the American population. That they were not
up to the task was evidenced by an early Forest Service effort to implement
the National Forest Management Act. A widely circulated questionnaire
asked respondents to indicate whether they preferred more, less, or the
same amounts of timber, wilderness, wildlife, recreation, etc. The uses
were not posed as alternatives. One could vote, as I did, for more of
everything. It was a prescription for continued depletion of the commons.
The Forest Service has since become more sophisticated in its
planning. It has hired professional planners who have produced mountains
of documents. Plans are emerging and being implemented, but many
people are unhappy. Although even those who are moderately concerned
about allocation of public land resources may be worn down by the
convolutions of professional planning, the economic interests and the
environmentalists will not be denied. The timber industry and cattlemen
say they are being run out of business. The environmentalists say that
species are endangered and wilderness lands are being lost forever. The
BLM and the Forest Service dodge bullets from all sides while they
struggle to be better planners. If only they could figure out what multiple
use really means, perhaps they could plan for it.
It is a cruel task we have set for our public land managers. They are
expected to provide diverse and often incompatible benefits from public
land resources, but they do not know what their allocational and distributional objectives are. The public lands legislation, along with the Administrative Procedures Act, provide ample guidance on how to go about making
decisions, but there is little guidance in terms of substantive goals. The
Multiple Use Act provides that the Forest Service's purpose is "not
necessarily . . . the greatest dollar return or the greatest unit output, "' 90
while the Federal Land Policy and Management Act requires the BLM to
"receive fair market value. . . unless otherwise provided for by statute. " "a
The BLM manager seems to have an affirmative goal, but the agency's
mission is clouded by requirements to "protect the quality of scientific,
environmental, air and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological
values," 92 while recognizing "the Nation's need for domestic sources of
minerals, food, timber, and fiber . . . .93 Congress did the easy part. It
wrote legislation expressing the desires of its numerous constituencies and
it even made express allocational choices in some cases, but the ultimate
allocational decisions are usually left to the agencies. What, when, where
and how much of alternative benefits and costs will be provided? On this

90.
91
92.
93.

16
43
Id.
Id.

U.S.C. §531(a) (1982).
U.S.C. § 1701(a)(9) (1982).
at § 1701 (a)(8).
at § 1701(a)(12).
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"highly complex""" problem, to use Congress' words, the public land
manager is left to referee a scramble for the resources of the commons.
With few exceptions the only guidance they have on making the allocational decisions isCongress' insistence that every interest group have a shot
at getting a piece of the public pie. It reminds an Oregonian of the Goals
and Guidelines which govern our comprehensive statewide land use
planning system. 95 We want to provide every conceivable benefit, or at least
every benefit that will influence the next election of public officials.
Proponents of public resource management and even most public land
managers will no doubt consider these views cynical. They will argue that
the public lands laws are extensive and detailed, that the planning
processes lead to informed decision making, that Congress can always act
to correct agency errors, and most importantly that the alternative of
private allocation has proven itself to be a failure. There can be no doubt
that the public land laws are extensive and detailed, and I suspect that some
useful information has been generated by Forest Service and BLM
planning, although at costs that often exceed the value of the outputs. But
the assertion that Congress can correct for agency mistakes is irrelevant to
my critique, and the claim that private allocation has proven its shortcomings is simply not true.
IV.

THE AGE OF DEREGULATION AND PRIVATIZATION

It may be that the age of deregulation and privatization has already
passed us by. President Bush appears to be a practical politician, unlike his
ideological predecessor. The politics of accommodation, rather than the
politics of principle, may be the earmark of the new administration. If so,
we are surely headed for more of the same in public lands management.
The public interest land laws of the 1960s and 1970s are the product of the
politics of accommodation. Some people win and some people lose, and
many of them feel better for having been in the fray. It may be good
politics, in a recreational sense, but it is no way to allocate scarce resources.
Although we purport to have allocational objectives, the reality is that
our commitment to public resource ownership and our existing public lands
management system are motivated largely by unarticulated distributional
ends. Like the grazing commons of old New England, the public lands
promise equality, which is good, and a free lunch, which is impossible. The
history of public lands management evidence that equality is elusive, and
that some people get free lunches at great expense to others. The fix is not
94. 16 U.S.C. § 1600(1) (1982).
95.

OREGON LAND CONSERVATION AND DEVELOPMENT

HANDBOOK ch. 2 (1978).

COMMISSION, OREGON LAND USE

PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. I 0

more public lands or more planning on the public lands we have. The fix
must be one which internalizes the costs and benefits of our allocational
choices so that we can know their real distributional consequences.
Public control and ownership is sometimes the best we can do, but
often it is not. As much of the world undertakes to correct for the failures of
centralized planning, our public land laws suggest that our learning curve
is flat. We have nearly a century of data from our experiment in public
management and should have learned the lessons from our own experience.
The greatest irony and tragedy of the environmental movement is its
reliance on the alleged failures of private property and the market as its
reason for being. Whenever it is suggested that private management of
resources might better serve the public interest, a refrain about resource
destruction by greedy capitalists arises from the environmental choir. But
these greedy capitalists could not have done it on their own. They had the
willing and able assistance of the government in every act of rape and
pillage. They got free land, tax subsidies, and favorable regulations from
friendly politicians and bureaucrats. And who is it that the environmentalists sue when they have complaints about resource management? In the
vast majority of cases the government is the defendant.
I do not mean to say that private resource managers have not made
mistakes-actions which adversely affect other people, plants and creatures. They have made plenty of mistakes, without the assistance of the
government. People are not less self-interested when they act privately
than when they employ the government to garner a share of the commons.
Alternative allocational institutions do not lead people to be more or less
public spirited. Values guide human pursuits, while legal institutions only
influence the intended and unintended consequences of those pursuits. In
effect they set the rules of the chase; and rules have ethical implications.
The choice between public and private control of resources should thus
turn on the consequences which the alternative institutional arrangements
are likely to deliver. Of course we must determine what consequences we
prefer, but it is foolhardy, and often counterproductive to insist on public
control of resources for its own sake.
Before we become reimmersed in the politics of accommodation,
perhaps we could at least attempt to answer the questions raised during our
era of deregulation and privatization. Simply addressing the questions does
not commit us to a policy of wholesale disposal of public lands. The ghost of
John Baden,96 who says he wants to keep the White House, Arlington
Cemetery and other such symbols of union in federal hands, does not need

96.

See, e.g., BUREAUCRACY VS. ENVIRONMENT: Tiii- ENVIRONMENTAL COSTS OF BUREAU-

CRATIc GOVERNANCE

(J. Baden & R. Stroup, eds., 1981).
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to haunt us. Baden and his former associates at the Political Economy
Research Center in Bozeman are not robber barons reincarnate. Most of
them are legitimate environmentalists, in terms of their personal values,
whose only sin is to openly challenge conventional environmental wisdom
and argue that private alternatives might better deliver environmental
benefits. That they seem to arouse such antagonisms is testimony to the
substance of their thinking, to entrenched biases about private management, and to the threat that privatization would pose to those who now
benefit from public resource management.
A society immersed in public interest philosophy and the processes of
public resource allocation tends to see the world as "us" and "them." This
essay has adopted that perception to describe the competing interests in
public land management debates. But the reality is that "us" consists of the
people who share our views on a particular allocational question and
"them" are those who disagree. It all comes down to individuals with
similar and different values who seek strength in numbers. If numbers were
actually determinate of public decisions, as democratic theory prescribes,
we would have a philosophically articulate basis for preferring public
control. But only the politically naive would claim that numbers control in
the management of public land resources.
Our objective in resource allocation should be to maximize net
benefits while assuring distributional fairness. On the maximization of net
benefits we have well developed theories which can guide our choice among
allocational institutions." To the extent that we care about maximizing net
benefits, those theories and our experience with alternative institutions, not
the legacy of two centuries of public land ownership, should guide our
decisions about public versus private control. If and when environmental
benefits are truly undervalued in the private market and can somehow be
corrected with government, public intervention may be appropriate. But
the risks to those seeking environmental benefits may prove to be greater in
the public arena, where it all depends upon influence, and nothing is
guaranteed beyond the next session of the legislature.
The distributional part of my prescription for resource allocation
raises more difficult institutional questions. We do not have the benefit of
the same level of sophistication in thinking about the impact of institutions
on wealth distribution. Because the private market has seldom been left to
deliver its own distributional results, we do not really know if it is the
distributional failure it is often claimed to be. The robber barons did their
robbing both from, and with the generous assistance of the government. In
97.
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theory government can assure any distributional results it chooses, but it
can do so only in a relative sense because it can only distribute what is
produced, and distribution has a clear and significant impact on productivity. As the robber barons proved, government control is an invitation to
those who prefer not to make money by working to increase productivity
and create value. Government control of resources fosters the creation of
another version of the commons.
Some view the sagebrush rebellion of the early 1980s as a recent
debate on the merits of public lands management, but it was not. It was a
generally unsophisticated argument over political turf in the spirit of
colonial land claims and two centuries of intervening assertions of states'
rights. Few of the sagebrush rebels sought to eliminate public control. Most
of them sought to shift public control from the federal to the state
governments so that they might better influence the decisions of public
managers. 8 There are good reasons to prefer localized public management
over national public management in certain circumstances, but it will
remain a commons with all of the attendant problems.
We should permit the spirit of a decade of deregulation and privatization to invigorate our thinking about public lands management. We should
not permit the forest of public interest legislation adopted over the last
three decades to obscure the underlying and basic questions which will
always face us in resource management. The presumption that public
management will always serve the public interest is belied by the history of
the American and other national economies. America's economic successes have been built upon the security and incentives of private property.
Although that private allocational system has created serious environmental problems, some of serious proportions, there is little reason to believe
that public managers would have avoided those problems. Indeed, there is
ample evidence that public managers created even worse environmental
problems, while subsidizing the environmental errors of the private sector.
Public management of resources by the federal government requires
central planning on a national basis. For a century that central planning
took place behind closed doors under the influence of well-heeled, private
interests. For the last three decades it has taken place in the open under the
influence of any interest willing to participate in the complex processes
enacted by Congress. These modern planning processes probably contribute at least modestly to distributional fairness, but not with reference to
any rational conception of what fairness requires. Any distributional gains
of modern public lands planning are the incidental consequence of having
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more interests involved in the scramble for scarce public resources.
The history of public lands management is one of private interests
seeking benefits from public land resources. The appeal of the system to
private interests is that they can enjoy the benefits of allocational decisions
while the public treasury bears at least some of the costs and many of the
environmental costs are ignored. Often the only costs to the private
interests are those associated with the political and legal transactions
necessary to maintaining influence in the public management process.
Logically such subsidies could only be justified on distributional grounds.
Most of the beneficiaries of public lands based subsidies can make no
defensible claim to such redistributions of wealth.
The public lands management system has gradually become an
apparently more sophisticated version of the grazing commons of old.
American society has paid a heavy price for the maintenance of that
commons over the last century. Modern legislation has lessened the
tragedy in some respects, but without a rational foundation, and at the
expense of rapidly rising transaction costs. We could do far better, both
economically and environmentally, if we abandoned the presumption in
favor of public management and took a hard look at the institutional
alternatives for managing the resources which are now in public ownership.
Merely addressing the question does not inevitably lead to the sale of
Yellowstone National Park or the Bob Marshall Wilderness Area or their
transfer to "ecological endowment boards" as Baden has recently argued. 99 If the presumption is well-founded, the wisdom of public control
will be demonstrated. If not, we may develop institutions which will lead to
better management of these scarce resources.
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